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Christian Aid exists to create a world where everyone can live a full life, 
free from poverty. 
Poverty is an outrage against humanity. It robs people of their dignity and 
lets injustice thrive. But together we have the power to transform lives.  
We are a global movement of people, churches and local organisations 
who passionately champion dignity, equality and justice in 37 countries 
worldwide. We are the changemakers, the peacemakers, the mighty  
of heart.  
We provide urgent, practical help in times of crisis and beyond. We seek  
to eradicate extreme poverty by tackling its root causes. Together with 
people living in poverty, we amplify our voices to speak truth to power and 
create lasting change. 
Everyone is equal in the sight of God. For over 70 years this has inspired 
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Arnobi Zapata and Andres Gil  
Vice-president of National Association of Peasant 
Reserve Areas (ANZORC: Asociación Nacional de 
Zonas de Reserva Campesina) and the National 
Spokesperson of COCCAM (a platform of peasant 
organisations); and President of ANZORC.  
For us Colombians, our conflict has been brutal and 
deadly, with over eight million victims. Our communities 
have been terrorised, particularly the most marginalised, 
with violence and displacement. Rural poverty and 
general inequality has created a breeding ground for all 
armed groups, guerrillas and paramilitaries.  
War economies have defined our lives. Colombia has by 
far the highest number of hectares of coca leaves in the 
world, showing how costly eradication programmes 
haven’t worked. Exclusion created a need for those of us 
on the margins to find ways to cope and survive.  For 
many of us displaced peasant farmers, our only option 
for survival was relying on illicit crop economies.  
A new hope for a different future emerged with the 
signing of the Final Peace Agreement on 24 November 
2016, following over 50 years of internal armed conflict. 
This wide ranging Peace Agreement covers six 
interconnected and interdependent areas. The promise 
of this new future is so crucial to us as it includes full 
rural agrarian reform; political participation; 
reincorporation of guerrillas and the dismantling of 
criminal organisations and finding solutions to the illicit 
economy. 
Both ANZORC and COCCAM were born as movements 
in response to discussions amongst Colombian peasant 
farmer organisations. Collectively we are made up of 
more than one million Colombians who inhabit 
approximately six million hectares and representing 62 
organisations and social movements. Our mission is to 
contribute to peace in Colombia and to guarantee the 
human rights of peasant farmers and the delivery of 
integrated rural reform (point 1 of the Peace Agreement).  
We are part of the historical struggle of the Colombian 
peasantry for access and the right to land and territory. 
We are seeking the recognition of the rights of peasant 
farmers and our right to territory and land, for us 
expressed in Peasant Reserve Zones - a specified area 
 
 
Christian Aid is a partner in 
the Drugs and (Dis)order 
Research Project and 
funded by the UK’s Global 
Challenges Research Fund, 
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development and 
peacebuilding actors 
globally and in Colombia, in 
our practical engagement in 
trying to support local 
communities in transforming 
war economies into peace 
economies in Colombia, in 
facilitating links between the 
academics and other key 
actors, foremost, local 
activists from COCCAM and 
ANZORC, but also the 
broader development 
sector, and the specific 
focus on peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation that 
we bring. 
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of land that is not only a refuge but also designated for 
the peasant economy. 
Our communities know what it takes to survive. We are 
integral to the solution of transforming from war to peace 
economies. As farmers, at the frontline of the illicit 
economy, the problem of coca, marijuana and poppy 
crops in the country cannot be addressed without 
engaging us. At the heart of this is the implementation of 
Point 4 of the Peace Agreement (on dealing with illicit 
drugs), which is expected to see thousands of families 
engage in voluntary, comprehensive and concerted 
substitution.  We want to play an active role in this 
transformation and building peace and delivering social 
justice in Colombia. 
However, today in Colombia, we face the great challenge 
of defending the commitments made in the Peace 
Agreement, which are at risk of being abandoned. We 
want our right to land, to health and work. Facing 
ongoing persecution of our leaders, we continue to 
mobilise and defend our livelihood and our cultural 
identity. We are committed to political and non-violent 
responses to our historical problems. The Peace 
Agreement cannot remain an aspiration, it must be 
implemented. If implemented, it would bring real and 
meaningful change. 
Solutions to transforming war to peace economies 
have to include people in marginalised territories in 
Colombia, and these solutions should be built by 
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A failure in counter-narcotic policy 
Trillions of dollars have been spent attempting to tackle 
illicit drug economies, but the problem continues to grow.1  
Globally, opium production has doubled since the turn of 
the century. According to the latest estimates, the global 
value of the illicit drug market could be between US$300 
and US$600 billion a year.2 In Afghanistan, Colombia and 
Myanmar, illicit drug cultivation has continued to grow 
even after the signing of ceasefires and peace 
agreements.3  
By any measure, this is a failure of counter-narcotic 
policy. Law enforcement (including policies associated 
with the “war on drugs”) rather than development and 
peacebuilding are at the leading edge of efforts to 
combat drug economies in fragile, borderland regions.  
This paper supports the case that the two strategic pillars 
of the “war on drugs” – the eradication of illicit crops and 
the militarisation of the fight against drug gangs – have 
both been a disaster. Globally, the fragile consensus 
surrounding the “war on drugs” is falling apart.4  
There are increasing efforts to establish counter-narcotic 
strategies that prioritise pro-poor development, align anti-
drugs policy with the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and move away from the militarised approach 
inherent in the “war on drugs”.  
While these iniatives are welcome, to date, the evidence 
base to support such policy reform remains weak. It is 
unclear how these seemingly opposed policy fields – 
drugs and development – can be reconciled in practice. 
The people left behind 
The SDGs provide a unique mandate for creating a 
better future for us all. Importantly, peacebuilding 
(SDG 16) is recognised as central to ending poverty and 
hunger. The ambitions of this global policy framework to 
‘reach the last first’ and ‘leave no one behind’ are 
admirable. 
Yet the SDGs are barely touching the places where 
peacebuilding challenges are most urgent: the margins 
(both geographical and economic) and the borderlands 
where violence, fragility and displacement are rife. 
Millions of people in these regions live in poverty, lack 
access to the bare essentials and, in certain countries, 
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are struggling to build peace after decades of war. These 
marginal spaces are frequently zones of extreme and 
chronic poverty. Here, livelihoods depend upon the 
informal, illicit or criminal economies; the imprint of the 
state is weak or fitful. These regions seem to be largely 
immune to development successes celebrated at the 
national and international levels.  
SDG 16 and other related goals, targets and indicators 
do not currently consider illicit drug economies to be an 
explicitly relevant factor in peacebuilding. This failure to 
understand the wider role of drug economies has real-life 
consequences for ordinary people - in different ways for 
men and women. It also misses development and 
peacebuilding opportunities. 
The complex development challenge posed by 
illicit crop economies 
By their nature, Illicit economies are criminalised, hidden 
and marginalised. They frequently expose communities 
on the margins to high levels of violence, dispossession 
and exploitation.  
And yet in certain contexts and conditions, illicit drug 
economies can also provide these same communities 
with an income, employment and protection amid 
violence, insecurity and poverty. Illicit economies can be 
a coping and survival mechanism for those excluded 
from markets and unable to obtain state protection.5  
The denial of economic, social and cultural rights is 
frequently both a driver and an outcome of state fragility, 
armed conflict and illicit economies. The continuing 
militarisation of the “war on drugs” has translated into a 
sustained and often devastating attack on human rights: 
from the use of the death penalty in 33 jurisdictions 
globally6 to the killings of human rights defenders in 
Colombia, who promote voluntary crop substitution and 
more humane public policies on illicit crops.7 
Peace processes typically aim to reduce the number of 
fighters and weapons, but tend to overlook, or fail to 
address, the impacts of illicit economies on long-term 
stability and development. 
Addressing a blind spot 
The SDGs provide an opportunity to develop new, 
contextually attuned approaches to counter-narcotics 
and peacebuilding efforts – based on solid research and 
applying a gender lens.  
Peace, illicit drugs and the SDGs   




States need to recognise the true impact of illicit 
economies and their role in development and 
peacebuilding when addressing the SDGs. This would 
encourage a radical shift away from the counter-
productive policies that have historically defined their 
relationship to illicit drug economies. 
There is a lack of data on the scale, depth and impact of 
illicit drugs crop economies. The issue is viewed largely 
in terms of law enforcement and there is an over-reliance 
on aggregated statistics collected by national 
governments. The nation-state clearly has a key role to 
play in people’s lives, from social protection to 
peacebuilding to economic development. But the SDGs’ 
reliance on the state as the primary unit of analysis leads 
to an underplaying of the sub-national and cross-border 
dimensions of conflict, fragility and illicit economies. As a 
result, the data collected is often on the wrong issues, 
based on limited data sets, or too dependent on 
government-generated data.  
The need for a new approach  
Drugs and development policies must complement each 
other1 to address the fundamental problems underpinning 
conflict and poverty in many parts of the world: the 
marginalisation and exclusion of these borderland 
territories and communities. We need a clearer, more 
rounded picture of how illicit economies really work, and 
the distribution of costs and benefits in developmental 
terms. We could then more fruitfully explore the ways in 
which drugs policy and development policy could be 
brought together in a complementary way to tackle these 
issues and accelerate our progress towards the SDGs. 
This paper is part of a major four-year consortium of 
global research networks and institutions that has been 
set up by the Drugs and (Dis)order Research Project and 
funded by the UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund. 
This research project is8 developing and testing 
approaches to integrate policies on drugs, development, 
peacebuilding and security based on longitudinal 
research in the borderlands of Afghanistan, Myanmar 
and Colombia. Here, addressing illicit drug crops 
continues to be fundamental to the transformation of war 
to peace economies.  
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Recommendations 
A new approach to transforming illicit drug crop 
economies is needed in order to support sustainable 
transitions that achieve the targets and ambition of 
the SDGs. Analysis and policy coherence are 
required to ensure that drugs and development 
policies are not working at cross purposes. We offer 
the following recommendations to better align 
peacebuilding, the tackling of illicit drug crop 
economies, and SDG 16.  
Address the blind spot in SDG 16 and engage 
systemically with the interaction between drug 
economies and development. States need to ensure 
that the indicators and monitoring mechanisms for SDG 
16 recognise and address the complex interactions 
between drug economies, development and 
peacebuilding. Reaching marginalised communities in 
borderlands requires an approach that goes beyond a 
state-centric model to look at how men and women in 
local communities mitigate risks through illicit activities; 
how they access credit despite the absence of formal 
credit providers; how they find informal income sources; 
and what relationships they form and deals they strike to 
obtain protection.  
Recognise illicit drug crop economies as a human 
rights issue. States should carefully consider human 
rights obligations when seeking to transition from war to 
peace economies. Routinely stigmatised and 
criminalised, communities surviving on illicit economic 
activities are typically denied their human rights, 
particularly access to justice and economic, social and 
cultural rights. The voices representing these 
communities must be heard and their human rights 
respected, protected and fulfilled. SDG monitoring should 
provide communities with alternative development 
opportunities, before embarking on eradication 
campaigns that wantonly destroy livelihoods and, in the 
worst cases, kill and maim. 
Abandon the approaches of the “war on drugs” and 
change the measure of success. Governments, 
regional and international bodies and institutions should 
abandon the counter-productive and damaging policies 
that have historically defined their relationship to illicit 
drug economies. The widespread criminalisation of the 
informal economy is not effective. The SDGs are an 
opportunity to encourage a new, contextualised 
Peace, illicit drugs and the SDGs   




approach: one that commits governments to build 
counter-narcotics and peacebuilding initiatives on a 
sound foundation of research and understanding. If the 
aim of counter-narcotics policy is to reduce people’s 
reliance on illicit crops and create peaceful transitions 
from armed conflict, the criteria of success should not be 
metrics like “reduction in hectares cultivated” or 
“kilograms of drugs seized”. They should be measures of 
economic development, access to public services, 
poverty reduction, respect for human rights, levels of 
human security, confidence in the state, and access to 
meaningful employment.  
Acknowledge trade-offs and mitigate harm. Particular 
counter-narcotics policies risk endangering peace as well 
as having long-term consequences for development 
goals. Policies and approaches to addressing illicit drug 
crop economies need to assess any risks or unintended 
consequences. Peace processes need a more rigorous 
analysis of how interventions are likely to impact on 
existing power dynamics and elite behaviour.      
Ensure illicit drugs are addressed in peace 
processes. States should apply nuanced strategies 
when dealing with transitions from war to peace 
economies. These have the best chance of improving 
prospects for peace. Crop eradication policies are deeply 
unpopular and potentially destabilising. Formal peace 
agreements that take into account existing political 
settlements – and how they are shaped by illicit 
economies – are more likely to succeed. Despite the 
violence and coercion, under certain conditions, illicit 
economies may fill gaps in building peace and 
reconstructing livelihoods. Rather than seeing illicit 
economies as problems to be solved by law enforcement 
operations, peace agreements are more likely to build 
sustainable peace if they adopt nuanced “do no harm” 
strategies and provide people with secure land tenure, 
access to public services, and alternative economic 
opportunities to address the factors that attract poor 
subsistence farmers to illicit activities in the first place. 
Finally, securitised/militiarised responses should not be 
the core of counter-narcotics or peacebuilding initiatives, 
but should complement locally sensitive development 
programmes. 
Focus on the margins in borderland areas and listen 
to women and the real experts. Economically and 
geographically marginal regions should become central 
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to any war-to-peace transition, with governments 
ensuring their political settlements are inclusive and 
bridge the conflicting priorities and interests of the centre 
and peripheries. States should then invest in further 
research and understanding of the perspectives of those 
living in the borderlands, and build (and fund) 
programmes that relate to this. Women often step into 
larger roles in the aftermath of conflict9 – making more 
decisions on everything from crop choice to use of credit, 
and having a growing influence in forgiving enemies and 
rebuilding community ties. Regardless of the context and 
situation, women’s insights and experiences need to be 
systematically documented by donors and other 
development actors to inform the design of development 
programmes. The communities involved in illicit drug 
economies are the real experts on resilience and 
survival. Policy-makers should learn from them and apply 
those lessons as they design their programmes. 
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The SDGs and the people left 
behind 
At a time of political fragmentation, splintering global 
cooperation and rising nationalism, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are a unique mandate for 
creating a better future for us all. Importantly, they 
include peacebuilding, and consider it critical to ending 
poverty and hunger. SDG 16, for example, aims to create 
peaceful, just and inclusive societies.10  
But as things stand, the SDGs are barely touching the 
places where peacebuilding challenges are most urgent 
– the margins and the borderlands where violence, 
fragility and displacement are rife.11 Across the world, 
millions of people in these regions live in poverty. They 
lack access to the bare essentials and are, in certain 
countries, struggling to build peace after decades of war. 
They are often forced to find unorthodox ways to survive. 
Many create their own social and political order. They are 
undoubtedly among the ‘furthest behind’ – those the 
SDGs have committed to ‘reach first’.  
And yet, because they typically live in areas with a weak 
or contested state presence and where data is limited, 
the SDG monitoring system will not measure whether 
they are achieving the goals or being left further behind.  
Often they turn to illicit drug economies. Under certain 
conditions, these economies can provide them with an 
income, employment and protection amid violence, 
insecurity and poverty.  
But illicit economies are by their nature criminal, 
unregulated and exploitative. So communities on the 
margins often have no choice but to live under the 
control of criminal networks in order to survive. This 
frequently means working in conditions of virtual slavery, 
while local bosses make all the economic gains. Families 
are sometimes forced to give up their daughters as 
‘opium brides’ to settle loans, because the opium crop 
has been destroyed by a government eradication team.12 
Armed criminals may be able to provide protection, yet 
the costs may be much more than the taxes used to 
maintain a regular police force.  
Those who try to avoid living under such a system face 
violence and coercion.13  
The SDGs are 
barely touching 
the places where 
peacebuilding 
challenges are 
most urgent  – the 
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Despite the dangers of engaging with illicit drug 
economies, they can, counterintuitively, benefit 
communities surviving on the margins.14   
However, SDG 16 and other related goals, targets and 
indicators do not currently consider illicit drug crop 
economies to be a relevant factor in peacebuilding. In 
fact, flawed assumptions persist that illicit economies can 
only be sources of instability,15 and that the communities 
engaged in them are ‘peace spoilers’.16     
Overall, the SDGs reflect the conventional view that illicit 
drug crop economies lie outside the development 
sphere. Instead of being seen as integral to the lives and 
livelihoods of those living on the margins, these 
economies are treated as a ‘distortion’ or pathology that 
must be isolated, combatted and destroyed. Therefore, 
law enforcement – including policies associated with the 
war on drugs – rather than development and 
peacebuilding are at the leading edge of efforts to 
combat drug economies in fragile, borderland regions.  
This agenda risks undermining collective efforts to 
achieve the SDGs, potentially leaving communities in 
these regions even further behind – the track-record of 
the ‘war on drugs’ would certainly suggest as much. 
What are “borderlands” and why do they matter? 
In countries undergoing war-to-peace transitions, 
borderland regions frequently experience continuing 
violence over the terms of the post-war political 
settlement. In otherwise stable states, these regions may 
be chronically violent places, with higher rates of 
homicide and human rights abuses than in many war 
zones.  
These marginal spaces - geographical as well as 
economic sectors marginalised from the mainstream 
economy - are frequently zones of extreme and chronic 
poverty. People depend upon the informal, illicit or 
criminal economies to make a living, and the influence of 
the state is weak or fitful. These regions seem to be 
largely immune to development successes celebrated at 
the national and international levels.  
The reform and justice processes at the heart of 
peacebuilding, which may take root in the centre of a 
“post-conflict” society, often never reach these margins. 
When viewed from these regions, “peace” often looks 
Despite the dangers of 
illicit drug economies, 
they can benefit 
communities surviving 
on the margins. 
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very different compared to the standpoint of those living 
at the centre.  
As a result, these neglected borderlands continue to be 
the scene of chronic violence and human rights 
violations. Zones of extreme poverty, they are home to 
communities that the SDGs promised to prioritise when 
they pledged to leave no one behind. Because 
borderlands often straddle international borders, their 
illicit economies cannot be addressed by a single state; 
subnational and regional approaches are vital. 
Only by understanding the borderland context, and the 
role of illicit drug crop economies in them, can we build 
peace and drive development.17 
 
A consortium to map the journey from war to peace 
For countries with sizeable illicit drug crop economies, 
such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Colombia, the 
question of how to transform from a war to peace 
economy is particularly urgent. Better understanding 
the role of illicit drugs economies within these contexts 
is a big part of solving this puzzle.  
That’s why a major four-year consortium of global 
research networks and institutions has been set up by 
the Drugs and (Dis)order Research Project and funded 
by the UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund.18 It is 
developing and testing approaches to integrate policies 
on drugs, development, peacebuilding and security 
based on longitudinal research in the borderlands of 
these three conflict-affected countries.  
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Why the war on drugs hasn’t 
worked 
Trillions of dollars have been spent attempting to tackle 
illicit drug economies, but the problem continues to 
grow.19 In his preface to the UN World Drug Report 2018, 
UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov emphasised 
that the production of opium and manufacture of cocaine 
today are ‘at the highest levels ever recorded’.20   
According to the latest estimates, the global value of the 
illicit drug market could be between US$300 and US$600 
billion a year. The vast majority of this enormous sum is 
captured by traffickers, while less than one percent of the 
final retail price goes to farmers.21 At such a scale and 
depth, it creates its own political, economic and financial 
infrastructures that put it well beyond the capacity of 
straightforward law enforcement to solve. Because the 
drugs market is more profitable than the trade in other 
consumable items like meat, wheat, coffee and tea, the 
supply and distribution chains it creates – along with the 
income and employment it generates – make it a 
development, as well as a legal, problem to solve. 
So far, the two strategic pillars of the ”war on drugs” – 
the eradication of illicit crops and the militarisation of the 
fight against drug gangs – have both been a disaster. 
Crop eradication has caused displacement and 
deforestation, while doing little to reduce cultivation 
levels. Aerial fumigation – the spraying of carcinogenic 
chemicals on illicit crops – has damaged people’s health 
and their environment. And the use of the military in law 
enforcement operations has led to egregious human 
rights abuses.22 
Summarising an October 2018 report by the International 
Drug Policy Consortium, a global network of 177 NGOs, 
a journalist stated: ‘Rivers of blood are being spilled in 
Southeast Asia in the name of countering narcotics.’23 
Since 2016, there have been an estimated 27,000 
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines related to President 
Duterte’s war on drugs.24 Despite the chorus of 
condemnation from around the world, Sri Lanka’s 
president has praised the Philippines’ “war on drugs”,25 
while Bangladesh is adopting the same tactics.26 It has 
become a case of the purported cure being much worse 
than the disease. 
Since 2016, there 
have been an 
estimated 27,000 
extra-judicial killings 
in the Philippines 
related to its “war on 
drugs” – an approach 
that has been 





International Drug Policy 
Consortium, Taking Stock: 
A Decade of Drug Policy, 
October 2018 
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The denial of economic, social and cultural rights is 
frequently both a driver and an outcome of state fragility, 
armed conflict and illicit economies. Systematic 
discrimination and economic and social inequalities, 
competition over resources, and the exclusion of 
communities from economic development all perpetuate 
cycles of deprivation and exclusion.27   
Violence can result in the denial of civil and political 
rights for communities, particular those at the margins, 
who face killings, displacement, and disrupted access to 
health and livelihoods. The continuing militarisation of the 
“war on drugs” has translated into a sustained and often 
devastating attack on human rights. The Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are now considering bills to 
reinstate the death penalty for drugs offences, and thus 
join the 33 jurisdictions worldwide – including China and 
Indonesia – where drug offenders are executed.28  
People who defend human rights in areas with sizeable 
illicit economies are increasingly at risk. In Colombia, at 
least 155 human rights defenders were killed in 2018 
alone. Since the beginning of 2019, one human rights 
defender has been killed there every 2.5 days on 
average.29 In 2017 and 2018, 47 members of the peasant 
farmer’s National Coordination for Cultivators of Coca, 
Amapola, and Marijuana – which gives cultivators of illicit 
crops a voice – were killed for promoting voluntary crop 
substitution and more humane public policies on illicit 
crops.30   
The “war on drugs” and its militarised response to illicit 
economies actually threatens progress on the SDGs and 
human rights obligations.Drugs and development policy 
must complement each other31 to address the 
fundamental problem: the marginalisation and exclusion 
of these territories and communities. 
Not just a war  
The “war on drugs” is by no means the only existing 
strategy for tackling global drugs use. In fact, the “war on 
drugs” is not a UN policy nor does it have a UN mandate: 
the UN has not declared or sanctioned any such war.  
The UN has mandated three conventions to be 
implemented by the criminal justice system (although 
they are the subject of disagreements within the UN)  
The “war on drugs” 
and its militarised 
response to illicit 
economies actually 
threatens progress 
on the SDGs.  
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¡ the prohibition of plant-based drugs, including 
cocaine, heroin and cannabis, with some exceptions, 
such as for medical use 
¡ the prohibition of synthetically manufactured 
substances that affect mind and behaviour, such as 
amphetamines or barbiturates  
¡ the criminalisation of illicit drug cultivation, trafficking, 
manufacture, sale, possession and money laundering.   
Another anti-drug approach is “harm reduction”. It is a set 
of strategies designed to reduce the negative 
consequences of drug use – from safer use to managed 
use to abstinence – though again there is dispute among 
UN members about the approach.32 
In practice, different countries and actors take different 
approaches, from more hardline approaches from states 
such as China and the Philippines, to experiments in 
legalisation in the United States,33 Latin America and 
Europe. There are increasing efforts to establish counter-
narcotic strategies that prioritise pro-poor development, 
align anti-drugs policy with the SDGs, and move away 
from the militarised approach inherent in the “war on 
drugs”. While welcome, the evidence base to support 
such policy reform remains weak. It is unclear how these 
seemingly opposed policy fields – drugs and 
development – can be reconciled in practice.  
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Selected SDG goals, targets and indicators relevant to 
tackling illicit economies 
The important global framework and commitments within the SDGs rely on nation-states as the primary unit of 
analysis. The SDGs are monitored in terms of how countries are able to deliver on their 169 targets and 232 
indicators. Countries report to the UN via the Voluntary National Reviews on progress on these targets and 
indicators. While this monitoring system is an improvement on the previous system used in the Millennium 
Development Goals, it does not adequately track places on the margins. In addition, the drug trade is a cross-
border trade – stand-alone country reports that monitor supply (in developing countries) but not demand (in rich 
countries) will not tell the whole story. 
 
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
¡ 1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to 
economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of 
property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including 
microfinance. 
Goal’s relevance: Two indicators measure access to basic services and secure tenure rights to land. But these 
do not examine the “why” and “how” of situations with no access. 
 
 
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture 
¡ 2.b Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the 
parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, 
in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round.  
Goal’s relevance: Subsidies in developed countries matter. For example, the decline in the global prices of 
cotton – due to subsidies to American cotton farmers – is one of the reasons why many Afghans are no longer 
planting cotton, and instead have adopted opium. 
 
 
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
¡ 3.3 By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat 
hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases. 
¡ 3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful 
use of alcohol.  
Goal’s relevance: Unlikely to be achieved if people who use drugs are criminalised. Drug use is a public health 
problem, not a law enforcement problem.  
 
 
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
¡ 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including 
trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation. 
Goal’s relevance: Does not tackle problematic traditional norms that legitimise girls offered as payment for 
loans (opium brides).   
 
 
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt 
biodiversity loss 
¡ 15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt 
deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally. 
Goal’s relevance: Target needs to monitor reasons why survivors encroach on forest ecosystems to plant coca. 
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Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access 
to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels 
¡ 16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere 
¡ 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen 
assets and combat all forms of organized crime 
¡ 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms 
Goal’s relevance: No other relevant indicator to monitor scale, depth and frequency of illicit economies. 
 
 
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development 
17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, 
to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection 
Goal’s relevance: Indicators rely exclusively on formal reporting, even in situations with larger informal 
economies. 
 
The need to see drugs as a 
development issue 
By treating illicit drug crop economies as primarily a 
matter of law enforcement, we’re missing the opportunity 
to see them from a potentially much more productive 
perspective: as a development issue.  
Applying a development lens highlights the fact that 
counter-narcotics policies risk undermining progress 
towards achieving the SDGs. It also indicates a need to 
think carefully about the costs and benefits of drug 
economies in developmental terms. This means taking 
seriously not only the harms generated by illicit 
economies, but also the positive roles they may play by 
providing a social safety net or even a means of wealth 
creation and upward mobility for poor, marginalised 
communities.  
Equipped with a clearer and more rounded picture of 
how illicit economies really work and the distribution of 
costs and benefits in developmental terms, we could 
more fruitfully explore the ways in which drugs policy and 
development policy could be brought together in a 
complementary way to tackle these issues and 
accelerate our progress towards the SDGs. 
So why do we currently lack such a picture?  
As already noted, the UN orthodoxy sees illicit drug crop 
economies as separate from the development sphere, 
legitimising their destruction by law enforcement 
agencies. A vicious circle is complete when the 
responsibility for dealing with drug economies is handed 
Equipped with a 
clearer and more 
rounded picture of 
how illicit economies 
really work and the 
distribution of costs 
and benefits in 
developmental 
terms, we could 
more fruitfully 
explore the ways in 
which drugs policy 
and development 
policy could be 
brought together  
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over to security forces who have no interest in exploring 
their developmental impacts (both negative and positive), 
nor the ability to do so. 
Drug economies are frequently ignored because 
researchers, policy-makers and non-governmental 
organisations would prefer not to engage with this 
“sensitive” area. There is also the problem that access 
for researchers can be difficult, and governments actively 
block or discourage such work. Even if the SDGs 
regarded illicit drug crop economies differently, there is a 
lack of data on their scale, depth and impact, because of 
an over-reliance on aggregated statistics collected by 
national governments. The nation-state clearly has a key 
role to play in people’s lives – from social protection to 
peacebuilding to economic development. But the SDGs’ 
reliance on the state as the unit of analysis leads to an 
underplaying of the sub-national and cross-border 
dimensions of conflict, fragility and illicit economies.  
There is also a tendency in dominant narratives about 
illicit economies to fetishise drugs, separating them out 
from their social and economic contexts. These 
narratives tend to treat those involved as victims, rather 
than individuals with agency, who make difficult choices 
about how to survive (and sometimes thrive) in 
challenging circumstances. It is time to move beyond this 
state-centric and top-down view. 
Beyond the state 
One way of avoiding the state-centric methodological 
pitfall is to consider illicit drug economies as commodity 
chains that transcend borders. Heroin and cocaine 
come from producer countries, pass through transit 
countries, and most are ultimately consumed in its 
main markets in Europe or North America.  
Within these chains, powerful incentives emerge. 
These often lead to a symbiosis between state and 
non-state actors that embed long-term corruption and 
erode state structures. In some areas, state or police 
forces may appear to be ‘cracking down’ on the illicit 
trades, but this may involve significant compromises; 
mutual interests are created, accommodations are 
made and ‘unholy’ alliances form. Certain countries 
have seen the emergence of state-sponsored 
protection rackets, defined as ‘informal institutions 
through which public officials refrain from enforcing the 
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law or apply it selectively, in exchange for a share of 
the profits’.34 
Viewing drug economies and their nuances in this way 
shows that single-country solutions or waging a war on 
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The consequences of the drugs 
and development blind spot 
This failure to understand the wider role of drug 
cultivation comes with real-life consequences for ordinary 
people, and missed development and peacebuilding 
opportunities. Take the role of women in illicit and 
informal economies. 
As communities move from war to peace, there are 
community discussions about how best to rebuild lives 
and livelihoods – the most profitable choice of crops, 
where to get and how to use credit, how to forge fruitful 
relationships with local authorities, and so on. In 
Christian Aid’s experience in Colombia, women are often 
taking the lead in these discussions.  
One intensely debated government policy in Colombia 
requires families to sign a legally binding contract not to 
The failure to understand 
the wider role of drug 
cultivation comes with 
real-life consequences for 
ordinary people. 
Mules carry petrol that will be used to turn coca into coca paste. In this village about 450 kilometres south of Bogotá, Colombia, the coca trade is 
vital. It brings cash and employment to the local economies of such areas, which typically have poor roads and infrastructure, lack access to public 
services and state institutions, and are marginalised from markets. Photo courtesy of AP Photo/Ricardo Mazalan.   
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plant coca and to switch to another crop. To date, up to 
90,000 substitution agreements appear to have been 
signed. But many women heads of household are 
baulking. They maintain that coca is “the better 
employer”, as it provides more income opportunities for 
women than other crops or activities. So they are 
refraining from signing the agreements, despite the risks 
of non-participation.35 
Understanding better how the illicit drug economy in 
Colombia is embedded in local communities could have 
helped shape a more nuanced and ultimately effective 
way of moving people out of it. 
This example does not lead to a simplistic argument that 
illicit economies are the answer to development 
problems; nor does it ignore the violence and coercion 
associated with them. But it does show that there are 
strong connections between drugs and development, 
which are being routinely ignored. This, in turn, leads to 
policies that undermine the survival strategies of those 
living on the margins.  
The SDGs are an opportunity to encourage a new, 
context-relevant approach: one that commits 
governments to build counter-narcotics and 
peacebuilding initiatives on a sound foundation of 
research and apply a gender lens. First, they need to 
recognise the true impact of illicit economies and their 
role in development and peacebuilding. That will help 
commit governments to abandon the counter-productive 
policies that have historically defined their relationship to 
illicit drug economies. 
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Flawed efforts to bring drugs 
policy and development together 
Already, in light of the failures of counter-narcotic policy, 
the consensus surrounding the “war on drugs” is falling 
apart.36  
Can policy-makers engaged with the SDGs provide a 
way to tackle this paradox, and unlock the puzzle of 
integrating development with counter-narcotics 
policies?  
A cautionary tale from Afghanistan demonstrates just 
how difficult and complex a problem this is. 
Governments need to abandon the orthodoxies that 
make illicit economies a ‘problem’ to be eradicated, and 
instead focus on addressing the deeper displacement, 
marginalisation and exclusion that drive people to rely on 
illicit solutions in the first place.  
The paradox of 
development in 
southwestern Afghanistan 
In around 2011, the Afghan 
government and donor agencies 
initiated the Food Zone 
Programme. It attempted to 
jumpstart development and 
wean farmers in Helmand 
Valley off opium production. It 
provided credit, agricultural 
advice, market information, 
better roads, and robust security 
and protection, while a strict 
opium ban was enforced. Soon, 
marked improvements in the 
well-being and income of these 
farmers were being recorded.  
Yet the programme had an 
unexpected consequence. The 
financial support meant farmers 
had less need to rent their 
properties to landless families or 
hire sharecroppers. These land-
poor households, who were not 
eligible for programme support, 
migrated in their thousands to 
the desert north of the Boghra 
canal, and opened up more 
fields for opium poppy farming. 
An otherwise successful 
development programme further 
marginalised and excluded 
land-poor communities.   
In the desert, the migrants, with 
loans from opium traders, 
bought land, built houses, sank 
deep wells, and continued the 
settlement of the desert. By 
2013, a transformation had 
occurred: an additional 300,000 
hectares of agricultural land was 
created, supporting hundreds of 
thousands of people.37 
An armed militant stands alongside a farmer collecting 
resin from an opium poppy field in Helmand Valley, 
Afghanistan (April 25 2008). Photo courtesy of AP 
Shutterstock. 
Peace, illicit drugs and the SDGs   




Illicit drug crop economies as 
sources of order and disorder 
Counter-intuitive as it may seem, illicit drugs have been a 
source of order as well as disorder. While violence and 
coercion are often part of the reason for that order, illicit 
crops and drugs have played key roles in preventing 
economic collapse and settling disputes, and have 
enabled marginalised territories to enjoy access to 
markets again,38 as the cases of Myanmar and Colombia 
show.  
In Myanmar, opium-financed rebel armies did not 
expand after a dramatic increase in opium and heroin 
production after 1989. Instead, many demobilised as 
deals around the drug economy were struck between 
rebel armies and the Burmese armed forces. Allowing 
the armed groups to maintain their involvement in the 
illicit drugs trade, while allowing them to invest profits in 
the legal economy, provided the foundation that helped 
stabilise the ceasefires. Consequently, levels of outright 
armed conflict in parts of Myanmar’s borderlands 
reduced.39  
Opium may have also prevented the collapse of the 
national economy under the weight of punitive 
international sanctions. Some of Myanmar’s biggest 
commercial firms and private sector employers emerged 
despite the sanctions, capitalised by revenues from the 
illicit drugs trade.40 The Asia World conglomerate, for 
example, whose founder was a key player in the drug 
economy, went on to build roads, airports, ports and 
Myanmar’s new capital, Naypyidaw – a clear indication of 
drug revenues providing funds for development.41   
The coca economy also revived Putumayo, a 
marginalised territory in southern Colombia. Villages 
that became centres of trade in coca paste consequently 
transformed into small ‘boom towns’: hotels were set up, 
transportation expanded, and demand for goods like 
cars, chainsaws, outboard motors and firearms 
increased. Thousands of migrants from across the 
country came to Putumayo and found work. As the 
volume of transactions expanded, a local financial 
system consolidated. Per capita bank deposits in 
Putumayo grew from 179 pesos in 1995, to 1,049 pesos 
in 2005: a more than five-fold increase in a decade of 
coca-led growth.42  
Counter-intuitive as it 
may seem, illicit drugs 
have been a source of 
order as well as disorder. 
Violence and coercion 
are often part of the 
reason for that order. 
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These examples demonstrate why eradication – the 
standard official response to illicit drug economies – 
should not be the only option. It should be considered 
alongside and properly sequenced with other 
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The need to see illicit drugs 
economies as a peacebuilding 
issue 
Eradication has frequently been the driving policy in post-
war Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar, but in each 
case there has been a huge expansion of illicit drug 
cultivation following the signing of peace agreements or 
agreement of a ceasefire.44 Perhaps this is no 
coincidence. 
Peace processes should not be aimed only at reducing 
the number of fighters and weapons. They must also 
look at how they can deal with the potentially 
destabilising effects of war economies. Governments 
have typically used three strategies: co-option, 
criminalisation and neglect.45  
Here is a brief overview of each.  
 
Co-option 
Offering non-state powerbrokers formal positions or 
other economic opportunities in a post-war settlement. 
Pros May prevent confrontations with groups the state 
can’t control by force. In some cases, such groups are 
better able to provide security, basic services and 
employment in borderland communities than the state. 
Giving them these responsibilities formally may prevent 
these services being disrupted in the immediate 
aftermath of a peace agreement.46 
Cons It risks conferring legitimacy on abusive warlords47 
and entrenching corrupt patronage networks into the 
formal system. 
Used in Afghanistan, Sudan, El Salvador, and 
elsewhere.48 
 
Criminalisation: Cracking down on the illicit drugs 
economy. 
Pros Judicious targeting of illicit economies may 
deprive belligerents of the resources they need to 
continue fighting and encourage them to seek peace. 
Cons Linking insurgency with crime often underplays 
political grievances.49 Casting insurgents as criminals 
may avoid political solutions that are necessary for 
long-term stability50 or tackle the symptoms without 
addressing the root causes of violence.51 It also fails to 
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recognise that illicit economies have benefitted many 
borderland communities.52 
Used in Colombia as part of the US programme started 
in 2000 to use development aid, military support, and 
diplomatic pressure to escalate the war on drugs and 
against leftist insurgents.53 In Afghanistan, opium bans 
were also enforced through the 2000s in the context of 
state-building efforts in the country.54   
Neglect Addressing high-level political and security 
issues during the peace process while paying less 
attention to illicit economies. 
Pros Can simplify and accelerate peace processes.55   
Cons Failing to address particularly exploitative or 
violent aspects of war economies can result in 
continuing armed violence and the strengthening of 
local militias. 
Used in Myanmar, where opium cultivation in the 
border regions increased without obvious state 
intervention, and where increases in opium yields 
corresponded to decreases in armed confrontations.56 
 
There is no clear consensus on which approach is most 
likely to succeed. However, the literature suggests that 
peace agreements that fail to sufficiently account for how 
illicit economies shape peace settlements are more likely 
to produce unstable and highly criminalised post-war 
regimes.57 Nuanced strategies have the best chance of 
improving prospects for peace and the widespread 
criminalisation of the informal economy is not effective. 
Crop eradication policies are deeply unpopular, 
potentially destabilising and often punish the most 
vulnerable. Formal agreements that take into account 
existing political settlements, and how they are shaped 
by illicit economies, are more likely to succeed.58   
There is a need to acknowledge and understand the 
significant tensions and trade-offs that exist between 
securing short-term stability and addressing longer-term 
drivers of violence and poverty. Policies and approaches 
to addressing illicit drug crop economies need to assess 
any risks or unintended consequences. Interventions to 
reduce violence and deal with war economies can be 
ineffectual or counter-productive, when they fail to 
analyse and engage effectively with underlying 
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configurations of power and processes of elite bargaining 
in conflict-affected states.59  
Colombia 
The unfulfilled promise of a new approach  
There are reasons to believe that, in Colombia, some of 
these more nuanced strategies are finally being 
employed to advance the cause of peace. 
After two decades and billions of dollars spent in 
Colombia on the archetypical counter-narcotics drive of 
the ”war on drugs”, coca cultivation reached an historic 
high in 2017. But the agreement signed in 2016 between 
the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas is 
the first-ever legally binding peace treaty to include 
tackling the illicit economy in its agenda. 
According the agreement, which received input from 
coca growers themselves, farmers would be able to take 
advantage of alternative development schemes while 
reducing their reliance on the illicit crop.  
However, the threat of forced eradication remains and 
the proper sequencing of crop reduction has been 
ignored, with farmers compelled to eradicate large 
swaths of coca crops instead of gradually reducing their 
dependence.  
The counter-narcotics element of the agreement relies 
mainly on providing cash-compensation to farmers, in 
conditions that are far from voluntary.   
In practice, forced eradication continues to be used 
alongside and in similar proportions to crop-substitution 
initiatives – “Colombia’s two anti-coca strategies,” notes 
The Economist, “are at war with each other.”  The final 
goal remains the reduction of hectares under cultivation, 
rather than addressing the marginalisation and exclusion 
that drives people into the drug economy. 
Nevertheless, the willingness of farmers to comply with 
the agreement has been unprecedented: the majority of 
coca growers have reportedly agreed to accept the 
proposals. This attitude reaffirms the often-heard lament 
of Colombian farmers that they cultivate coca only as a 
last resort, and would willingly stop if other viable options 
were available. It also undermines the impression, 
common in Colombia, that the farmers are mere profit-
driven criminals, or “narco-cultivadores.”   
‘Colombia’s two anti-coca 
strategies are at war with 
each other.’ 
The Economist  
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Recommendations and policy 
implications 
A new approach to transforming illicit drug crop 
economies is needed in order to support sustainable 
transitions that achieve the targets and ambition of 
the SDGs. Analysis and policy coherence are 
required to ensure that drugs and development 
policies are not working at cross purposes. We offer 
the following recommendations to better align 
peacebuilding, the tackling of illicit drug crop 
economies, and SDG 16.  
Address the blind spot in SDG 16 and engage 
systemically with the interaction between drug 
economies and development. States need to ensure 
that the indicators and monitoring mechanisms for 
SDG 16 recognise and address the complex interactions 
between drug economies, development and 
peacebuilding. Reaching marginalised communities in 
borderlands requires an approach that goes beyond a 
state-centric model to look at how men and women in 
local communities mitigate risks through illicit activities; 
how they access credit despite the absence of formal 
credit providers; how they find informal income sources; 
and what relationships they form and deals they strike to 
obtain protection.  
Recognise illicit drug crop economies as a human 
rights issue. States should carefully consider human 
rights obligations when seeking to transition from war to 
peace economies. Routinely stigmatised and 
criminalised, communities surviving on illicit economic 
activities are typically denied their human rights, 
particularly access to justice and economic, social and 
cultural rights. The voices representing these 
communities must be heard and their human rights 
respected, protected and fulfilled. SDG monitoring should 
provide communities with alternative development 
opportunities, before embarking on eradication 
campaigns that wantonly destroy livelihoods and, in the 
worst cases, kill and maim. 
Abandon the approaches of the “war on drugs” and 
change the measure of success. Governments, 
regional and international bodies and institutions should 
abandon the counter-productive and damaging policies 
that have historically defined their relationship to illicit 
drug economies. The widespread criminalisation of the 
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informal economy is not effective. The SDGs are an 
opportunity to encourage a new, contextualised 
approach, one that commits governments to build 
counter-narcotics and peacebuilding initiatives on a 
sound foundation of research and understanding. If the 
aim of counter-narcotics policy is to reduce people’s 
reliance on illicit crops and create peaceful transitions 
from armed conflict, the criteria of success should not be 
metrics like “reduction in hectares cultivated” or” 
kilograms of drugs seized”. They should be measures of 
economic development, access to public services, 
poverty reduction, respect for human rights, levels of 
human security, confidence in the state, and access to 
meaningful employment.  
Acknowledge trade-offs and mitigate harm. Particular 
counter-narcotics policies risk endangering peace as well 
as having long-term consequences for development 
goals. Policies and approaches to addressing illicit drug 
crop economies need to assess any risks or unintended 
consequences. Peace processes need a more rigorous 
analysis of how interventions are likely to impact on 
existing power dynamics and elite behaviour.  
Ensure illicit drugs are addressed in peace 
processes. States should apply nuanced strategies 
when dealing with transitions from war to peace 
economies. These have the best chance of improving 
prospects for peace. Crop eradication policies are deeply 
unpopular and potentially destabilising. Formal peace 
agreements that take into account existing political 
settlements – and how they are shaped by illicit 
economies – are more likely to succeed. Despite the 
violence and coercion, under certain conditions, illicit 
economies may fill gaps in building peace and 
reconstructing livelihoods. Rather than seeing illicit 
economies as problems to be solved by law enforcement 
operations, peace agreements are more likely to build 
sustainable peace if they adopt nuanced “do no harm” 
strategies and provide people with secure land tenure, 
access to public services, and alternative economic 
opportunities to address the factors that attract poor 
subsistence farmers to illicit activities in the first place. 
Finally, securitised/ militiarised responses should not be 
the core of counter-narcotics or peacebuilding initiatives, 
but should complement locally sensitive development 
programmes. 
Rather than seeing illicit 
economies as problems 
to be solved by law 
enforcement operations, 
peace agreements are 
more likely to build 
sustainable peace if they 
adopt nuanced “do no 
harm” strategies and 
provide people with 
secure land tenure, 
access to public services, 
and alternative economic 
opportunities to address 
the factors that attract 
poor subsistence farmers 
to illicit activities in the 
first place.’ 
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Focus on the margins in borderland areas and listen 
to women and the real experts. Economically and 
geographically marginal regions should become central 
to any war-to-peace transition, with governments 
ensuring their political settlements are inclusive and 
bridge the conflicting priorities and interests of the centre 
and peripheries. States should then invest in further 
research and understanding of the perspectives of those 
living in the borderlands, and build (and fund) 
programmes that relate to this. Women often step into 
larger roles in the aftermath of conflict60 – making more 
decisions on everything from crop choice to use of credit, 
and having a growing influence in forgiving enemies and 
rebuilding community ties. Regardless of the context and 
situation, women’s insights and experiences need to be 
systematically documented by donors and other 
development actors to inform the design of development 
programmes. The communities involved in illicit drug 
economies are the real experts on resilience and 
survival. Policy-makers should learn from them and apply 
those lessons as they design their programmes. 
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